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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OR CRIMINAL
MISTAKE? - AN ANALYSIS OF PAST
AND CURRENT CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
FOR CLINICAL MISTAKES AND
FATAL ERRORS
Paul R. Van Grunsven*

INTRODUCTION
On the evening of March 29, 1992, Nelson Yamamoto, a twenty-si.-yearold deputy with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, became
involved in a shootout with a criminal suspect. Yamamoto was hit four
times by the bullets of his assailant, who days later would be killed by
police in New York.' Wounded in the abdomen, thigh, shoulder and toe,
Yamamoto was rushed by ambulance to Martin Luther King JrJDrewv
Medical Center (King), a 334-bed county teaching hospital near Watts.
King hospital is renown for its heavy load of trauma patients and a
medical staff that is skilled at treating multiple gunshot wounds. The
reputation of King in treating gunshot wounds is so well known, the
United States Army once sent physicians to train at this hospital because
the wounds treated there were so similar to combat injuries!
Newspaper reports indicate that Yamamoto was conscious and alert
when he arrived at King.3 Surgeons worked nearly eight hours in two
consecutive operations to repair his colon and intestine, and to tie off
blood vessels in his pelvic area and thigh. Yamamoto died about thirty*Partner, Techmeier & Van Grunsven, S.C., Milwaukee, WI. B.S., 1983, J.D, 1936,
Marquette University, LL.M., 1995, DePaul University.

'Claire Spiegel, Hospital'sCareOf Deputy Probed.L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, Part B, at
1, col. 22.

Id.

'Ralph Frammolino & Virginia Ellis, GrossNegligence In Case At King HospitalAllcgcd,
L.A. TMES, July 21, 1995, Part A, at 1.
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two hours after surgery and a coroner later ruled that Yamamoto had died4
from massive bleeding, shock, and lung damage caused by his wounds.
Yamamoto was buried in April, 1992 with a hero's funeral that drew
nearly 4,000 uniformed officers from all over Southern California.5 In
May, 1992, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and
California Medical Board began an investigation after informants alleged
that other factors led to Yamamoto's death. Newspaper reports suggest
this investigation was launched after the Sheriffs Department received
complaints about Yamamoto's treatment.7 The matter was also brought
to the attention of the state medical board who asked King hospital in
May, 1992 to turn over Yamamoto's medical records.'
Deputy District Attorney Brian Kelberg, head of the office's
medicolegal division, launched an investigation into Yamamoto's death.
Working with investigators from the California Medical Board and the
Sheriffs homicide division, Kelberg interviewed eight physicians in
addition to various nurses and paramedics. 9 The first few physicians
interviewed by Kelberg "came back really shaken" and expressed concern
about being there without legal representation. Newspapers reported that
the former medical director at King asked Los Angeles County counsel's
office to represent the King physicians at subsequent interviews by
Kelberg, but this request was initially refused." The physicians were,
therefore, forced to hire a private attorney. After the physicians' private
attorney objected to the interviews, Kelberg resorted to the use of a county
grand jury summons to continue his investigation.
One of the King physicians brought before the grand jury to testify
was Dr. Rosalyn Sterling Scott. Dr. Scott was highly regarded in medical
circles as being the first black woman in the country certified as a thoracic
surgeon." Dr. Scott was no stranger to high profile cases: She operated
on a senator who'd been shot, a SWAT team member who accidentally

4Id.
SSee Spiegel, supra,note 1.
6

See Frammolino & Ellis, supra,note 3.

7

See Spiegel, supra,note 1.
'Id.
9
1d.
0

' d.
"Julie Marquis, Vindication Came HardForDoctorIn Deputy's Death, L.A.TIMES, Dec.
8, 1997, Part A, at 1.
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shot himself, and a little girl gunned down in a schoolyard.' 2 Newpaper
reports indicate that Scott and others were questioned before the grand
jury. These reports indicate that on the
advice of her attorney, Scott
3
invoked her Fifth Amendment rights.1
Kelberg told newspapers he was examining the amount of time Dr.
Scott, the attending physician in charge, was present during Yamamoto's
treatment. 14 Records provided to the medical board reportedly indicated
that Dr. Scott signed several medical prescriptions for Yamamoto, but he
entered virtually no patient care notes. 5 In addition, newspaper reports
indicate Kelberg was also focusing on the administration of two cardiac
drugs -- Verapamil and Labetalol -- shortly before Yamamoto's death.
Kelberg reportedly questioned whether the administration of these drugs
by Dr. Jonathan Heard was appropriate.' 6 Also under investigation, was
whether Yamamoto was over-transfused with blood and overloaded with
fluids prior to his death. 7 Although Kelberg allegedly admitted to
newspapers that the surgeons did a "first class job" in repairing
Yamamoto's colon and intestine and tying off blood vessels in his pelvic
area and thigh, he added he was concerned about the amount of blood and
fluid Yamamoto received during and after surgery.' 8
In the summer of 1995, the results of the two and one-half year joint
investigation by the District Attorneys' office and the California Medical
Board into Yamamoto's death were released in a 160-page report.' 9 The
report criticized the physicians at King for pumping so much blood into
0 The
Yamamoto during surgery that some had to be drained afterward?)
report also criticized the physicians for what one of the medical experts
said was the "ridiculous" mistake of mixing the heart drugs - a deadly
error that could have been avoided by reading the standard physician's
reference manual.2' Newspapers reporting on this case obtained a copy of
the report and quoted the report as stating, "The evidence ...
clearly

121d.

13Id.
"Spiegel, supra, note 1.

151d.

161d.
17Id.

"See Frammolino & Ellis, supra,at note 3.
20Id.
21

1d.
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established that an immediate cause of Deputy Yamamoto's death was the
inappropriate administration of two cardiac drugs, Verapamil and
Labetalol, by Dr. Jonathan Heard, compounded by the overall
mismanagement of Deputy Yamamoto's postoperative condition ...
by Dr.
22
'
Sterling Scott and Dr. Heard." These same newspaper reports indicated
that Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti decided not to file
criminal charges in this case.23 Reportedly, Garcetti determined that,
although there was enough to charge Heard with involuntary
manslaughter, he decided not to file a case primarily because juries are
reluctant to send physicians to jail for mistakes made in good faith, no
matter how grievous.24
Undaunted by the District Attorney's decision not to file criminal
charges, the California Medical Board, in July, 1995, filed administrative
charges against four of the physicians who treated Yamamoto." The
medical board sought to strip the licenses of these four physicians and
among those charged by the board was King's vice chairwoman of
surgery, Dr. Rosalyn Sterling Scott. Following the release of the report
and the issuance of charges by the Medical Board, the county abruptly
pulled Scott from clinical practice.26 Newspaper reports quoted Scott as
stating she8 felt branded as "a murderer," ' and that she "decided not to go
2
quietly.
Outrage within the medical community quickly followed the Medical
Board's actions in the Yamamoto case. Many highly regarded physicians
stepped up to defend Dr. Scott and the other physicians subjected to
charges by the Medical Board. Newspapers reported Dr. Robert Replogle,
former president of the Society of Thoracic Surgeons, as stating "[i]f this
happens, when patients come in filled full of bullets, physicians are going
to lock the doors .... This one had to be stopped." 29 Dr. Brian Johnston,
former president of the Los Angeles County Medical Association,

2'Id.
"Id.
24

Id.

"Id.
"276See Marquis, supra,note 11.
Id.
28

d

29Id
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described the investigation
as "a search for a scapegoat and that turned out
30
to be Dr. Scott.
Newspaper reports provided ammunition for defenders of Dr. Scott.
These reports cited to the April, 1992 autopsy report which stated that
Yamamoto died from his gunshot wounds, the type that can cause death
"even with excellent medical and surgical attention." 31 These newspaper
reports also stated early reviews of the Yamamoto case by local physicians
- both inside and outside King - found the care met medical standards as
well. 2 The newspaper reports went on to suggest the Medical Board's
actions against Scott and the other physicians were politically motivated
by recent bad press.33 At the beginning of 1993, an investigative report
concluded the Board had disposed of hundreds of complaints against
physicians in 1990 to clear a growing backlog.34
Committees of both the Society of Thoracic Surgeons and the Los
Angeles County Medical Association independently reviewed the medical
records, and concluded the care met medical muster.3 s In 1997, after the
Medical Board consulted with a wider array of experts and had a
physician interview Scott, it dropped the accusations against Scott and
Heard. 36 The Board, however, tried to force the two physicians to take
competency examinations and both refused.37 Ultimately, Heard took the
exam and passed. In August, 1997, the board notified Scott she would
not be required to take the test after all.39
As of December, 1997 Scott had yet to be restored to her clinical
duties. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times, Scott provided insight
into her resolve to defend herself stating, "most physicians when they get
into a situation like this, they try to settle, they want it to go away .... I
was not going to allow the D.A. and the Medical Board to push me into
taking any position that would represent anything short of complete

3Id.

"Id.
1
33
d.
3Id.

5

31d.

361d.

37Id
38Id.
3Id.
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vindication." 40 Whether complete vindication was in fact achieved is
questionable as this case likely left permanent "scars," both professional
and emotional, on Dr. Scott and others whose care was the focus of the
Yamamoto investigation.
Media fascination with criminal prosecutions of health care providers
for negligence which causes injury or death appears to be at an all time
high. These cases are typically viewed as "high-profile" cases as they
involve criminal sanctions against health care professionals, rather than
the payment of damages. The prospect of a physician, nurse, lab
technician, or other health care professional being convicted of "criminal
activity" and facing possible imprisonment captures the curiosity of the
public and makes for "good copy." At the outset, this Article will explore
the history of criminal prosecutions of health care providers for
"negligent" conduct that causes injury or death. The Article will also
highlight some of the more recent cases which resulted in criminal
prosecutions against health care providers in relation to patient care.
PEOPLEv. MILOS AL VANA
The criminal prosecution of physicians for negligence which causes death
or serious injury can be traced back to the case brought against Milos
4
Klvana and his conviction on nine counts of second-degree murder. '
Interestingly, Klvana was prosecuted and convicted by the same unit of
the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office that was subsequently
responsible for the investigation into the death of Officer Yamamoto.
Newspapers, in fact, noted that the same unit of the District
Attorneys'office investigating the Yamamoto case also prosecuted Klvana
and was the first in the country to convict a physician of murder due to
poor care. 42
40
1d.
41

People v. Klvana, I I Cal. App. 4th 1679, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1992).
In addition to being convicted of second-degree murder (PEN. CODE § 187, subd. (a)), Klvana was
also convicted of five counts of aiding and abetting the practice of medicine without a license
(Bus. &PROF. CODE § 2053), one count of conspiracy to practice medicine without a license (Sec.
182/Bus. &PROF. CODE § 2053), nineteen counts of preparing false insurance claims (INS. CODE
§ 556, subd. (a)(3)), ten counts of presenting false insurance claims (INS. CODE § 556, subd.
(a)(1)), two counts of grand theft (PEN. CODE § 487, subd. (1)) and two counts of perjury (PEN.
CODE §42 118).
See Marquis, supra note 11.
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Klvana attended medical school in Czechoslovakia and obtained a
degree in 1967. 43 In July, 1972, he began a four-year residency programin
New York, but resigned when he failed to become Chief Resident."
Klvana applied for and was granted a California medical license and was
accepted into a two-year anesthesiology residency at Loma Linda
University Hospital (Loma Linda).45 In late 1976, Loma Linda's
reviewing faculty concluded that Klvana was responsible for a patient's
death due to his failure to closely monitor the effects of drugs
administered and to detect early signs of depression and inadequate
breathing which resulted in cardiac arrest.46 After Klvana was informed
that he would not be reappointed to Loma Linda's residency program, he
resigned on December 16, 1976. 47 Between 1977 and 1982, a pattern
emerged where Klvana applied for privileges at various hospitals, many
times failing to disclose his Loma Linda residency or his probationary
status, 48 and misrepresenting his board eligibility.49 On December 20,
1980 Klvana purchased the Diet-Rite Medical Clinic, and it was at this
clinic where he came in contact with patients whose care ultimately
became the subject of his arrest and criminal conviction.
The Johnson Death
When Kathleen Johnson became pregnant in 1982, she sought a physician
who would agree to a vaginal delivery because she had been displeased
with the manner in which a previous Cesarean section delivery had been
handled.50 Johnson responded to Klvana's advertisement in the Yellow
Pages.5" Klvana did not inform Johnson of any risks associated with a

43
Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
"Id.

4SId.
"Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 515.
471d

41On March 14, 1980, following Klvana's misdemeanor conviction of 26 counts of

prescribing controlled substances without a good faith examination, Klvana's license was placed
on probation for five years by the Board of Medical Quality Assurance (BMQA). In his
applications for privileges at Hollywood Presbyterian and Valley Vista, and for p,-rmission to
supervise a physician's assistant filed with the California Physician's Assistant Examination
Committee, Klvana misrepresented that his medical license had never been limited, suspanded,
revoked or otherwise disciplined. Id.

41Id. at 516.
5Ol
51

KIvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516.
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vaginal delivery following two Cesarean section deliveries, and assigned
a December 10, 1982 due date. 2 Johnson later inquired into the
availability of an alternative birthing center and Klvana informed her he
was preparing a birthing room in his office since he was concerned about
the influence and pressure other practitioners might exert on Johnson
regarding a Cesarean section. 3 On December 14, 1982, Johnson had an
office visit with Klvana. Already past her due date, Klvana told Johnson
54
he miscalculated her due date and not to worry about not yet delivering.
Johnson began labor on December 23, 1982 and went to Klvana's
office. After declining Klvana's suggestion that she have her membranes
ruptured in order to hasten delivery, Johnson was sent home with
instructions to call when her labor progressed.5 Johnson returned to
KIvana's office the next morning and he determined she was only dilated
three centimeters.5 ' Klvana adninistered Pitocin to Johnson, but failed to
use an infusion pump or electronic fetal monitor during the drug's
administration.57 With Johnson's husband holding the bag of intravenous
Pitocin solution in the air, she began to have intense contractions.5 8
KIvana occasionally checked the fetus's heart rate, took Johnson's blood
pressure and pulse only once, and never adjusted the infusion rate of the
Pitocin.59 After the delivery of a baby girl, in response to Johnson's
concern that her baby did not seem responsive, Klvana stated the baby was
breathing normally.' Klvana indicated the Johnson baby was fine and did
an appointment for the baby to see a pediatrician the following
not make
6
day. 1
Later that night, the baby girl cried and refused to eat.6 The
following morning, she developed seizures and labored breathing.63
Klvana suggested the problem was low blood sugar and that "it was
probably better [for the baby] not to go to the hospital because
S'Id,at 516.

SId.
' 41d. at 517.
55

1d.

S6 d.
SKIvana,
58
1d.
S0Id"

15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.

9

s1d.

"Klvana,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 517.
2

6 Id.
63
1d.
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[hospitalization] would probably result in unnecessary intervention."-'
Klvana recommended the baby be given sugar water, which the baby
refused.65 The baby's breathing continued to be labored until she stopped
Efforts at CPR were unsuccessful and the baby was
breathing.
pronounced dead at the hospital.
An autopsy determined the baby girl's cause of death was respiratory
distress syndrome and hyaline membrane disease.67 A pediatric pathology
expert subsequently concluded that perinatal asphyxia was the most likely
cause of death.6
The Fava Death
Joanne Fava became pregnant in 1983 and visited Dr. Klvana's office in
March of that year.69 Klvana estimated a due date between August 10, and
25, 1983.70 On August 24, 1983, after Fava's water broke, Fava and her
family met Klvana at his office.7 ' After examining Fava, Klvana indicated
she was not ready to deliver and stated she should return home.72 Later
that evening, Fava's contractions grew stronger and she and her family
returned to Klvana's office.7 Klvana examined Fava while one of Fava's
relatives (who worked for Klvana) monitored the fetus's heartbeat with a
stethoscope. 74 After several hours, Fava repeatedly requested Klvana to
perform a Cesarean section delivery.'5 Klvana said it would take up to
two hours to set up the surgery, and he would instead induce labor 76
Klvana administered a drug intravenously and sometime later added
something to the intravenous line which he indicated was to induce
labor 7 Fava's relative notified Klvana that the fetus's heartbeat was very

64id.

'Id

6"Klvana,
7

15 Cal. Rptr. 2dat517

1d.

6

81d.
69Id.
1d.

70

71Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
"Id.
7

'Id

76
K vana,
71

d.

15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
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faint, yet Klvana did not send Fava to a hospital.7" Klvana thereafter
examined Fava and determined the fetus had died.79 Klvana informed
Fava of the fetus's death and, along with Fava's family members, pushed
on Fava's abdomen; the dead body of a six pound, thirteen ounce fetus
was delivered.80
In June, 1985, when Fava asked Klvana for birth and death
certificates, Klvana indicated that he was being investigated and did not
prepare either document.8 Klvana allegedly requested that Fava not tell
anyone that she gave birth.82
The James Death
In August 1983, Julie James began seeing Dr. Klvana for management of
her pregnancy. On October 10, 1983, James visited Klvana's office and
was dilated three or four centimeters.83 Klvana administered Pitocin and
James began to have harder contractions. 84 James was never connected to
an electronic fetal monitor and Klvana moved her to the waiting room so
he could attend to another patient in the birthing room. When Kivana
was through with the other patient, he stopped administering Pitocin to
James and told her to return to the office the following day.86
When James returned, the receptionist allegedly told her Klvana was
too busy with other patients to attempt to induce labor.87 Later, when
Klvana examined James she was dilated four centimeters and he broke her
water.8 James, was told to call Klvana when she went into labor.89 James
called Klvana when the contractions were fifteen to twenty minutes
apart.90 Pursuant to Klvana's instructions, she again called when the
contractions were five, four, and three minutes apart.9' Klvana met James
7

91d.

79

1d.

soId.
"Klvana,
15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
82Id.
93Id.

"Id.

851d.

S6Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518
87Id.

"Id.
"9Id.
'OId.
9'Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 518.
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at his office; she was dilated nine centimeters and Klvana administered
Pitocin.92 At approximately 11 o'clock in the morning, Klvana and the
baby's father began physically pushing on James' abdomen.93 During the
last hour of James' labor, Klvana monitored the fetus's heart rate with a
stethoscope.94
Upon delivery of a baby girl, Klvana took the baby to a small
bathtub, flushed her with water, and massaged her chest.9s He left the
room with the baby, leaving James, who was bleeding heavily, on the
bed. 96 Klvana thereafter informed the parents the baby had died and made
two injections into James' uterus, telling her the injections would stop the
bleeding, but this was not successful. 97
James inquired about an autopsy and was told by Klvana that an
autopsy would cost $1,500.98 KIvana allegedly recommended James bury
the baby in her backyard, not tell anyone about the death, and take a
vacation to Hawaii. 99 An autopsy was conducted, which found swelling
and bleeding under the scalp and concluded the cause of death was a lack
of oxygen at the time of birth."° The autopsy revealed no evidence offd.
hypoplasia of the lung, the cause of death listed by Klvana on the death
certificate. 01
The foregoing represents only three of the several cases summarized
in the decision of the California Court of Appeals which affirmed the
conviction of Dr. Klvana.10 2 The appellate court, in affirming the
conviction of Klvana, made note of the expert testimony introduced at trial
to support the verdict against him. A board certified obstetrician and
gynecologist testified that continuous electronic fetal monitoring and
administration by an infusion pump are necessary when Pitocin is used to
induce or augment labor.01 3 Another expert, a board certified obstetrician
92

Id.

93

1d.

9

id.

95Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
97
1d. at 518. A footnote to this opinion indicates that James continued to bleed for six
weeks.
9

8M.
Nfd.
10Id.
1

'OKlvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
1

mid.

"'Id.at 525.
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and gynecologist with a subcertification in high risk obstetrics, testified
his review of the deliveries at issue revealed the following recurring
events: use of Pitocin without adequate fetal monitoring, unmanaged
signs of fetal distress, failure to adequately perform neonatal resuscitation,
failure to transfer sick babies to the hospital, and failure to transfer high

risk mothers for hospital deliveries.'O' This expert also testified Klvana's
history in his residencies, his repeated loss of hospital privileges,10 5 and
04Id.

"'5Klvana's hospital privilege history is as follows:
GranadaHills Hospital,California
Applied: November, 1976
Granted: May 24, 1977
Reappointed: 1982 and 1983
Resigned: October 18, 1983
NorthridgeHospital,California
Provisional: February 14, 1977
Associate: November 28, 1978
Provisional reappointment granted: March 19, 1979
Reapplication granted: November 28, 1979
Reapplication granted: August 1981
Resigned: January 31, 1983
Henry Mayo Hospital, California
Applied: April 25, 1977
Granted: September 19, 1977
Revoked: December 18, 1980
Reapplication: August 21, 1981
Delivered baby without privileges: October 9, 1981
Application denied: February 11, 1982
Reapplication: May 10, 1983 (denied)
Hollywood Presbyterian Hospital, California
Applied: March 17, 1980
No action taken due to BMQA probation
Valley Vista Hospital, California
Temporary admitting/clinical privileges: January 15, 1982
Applied: February 20, 1982
Denied: April 22, 1982
Temporary admitting/clinical privileges suspended: May 7, 1982
East Los Angeles Hospital, California
Applied: May 31, 1982
Granted: June 16, 1982
Letter regarding unacceptable quality: April 18, 1984
Letter regarding ineffectual tubal ligation/privileges
Revoked: February 7, 1985
Revoked: February 27, 1985
Letter regarding below standard of care: March 19, 1985
Removed from medical staff: April 10, 1985.
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repeated warnings by other physicians served notice on Klvana that "he
had difficulty in judgment making, particularly regarding the management
of obstetric patients."'3 Based on the evidence, this expert concluded it
was impossible7 to believe Klvana was not aware of the risks he ,,as
10
disregarding.
Following his conviction ofnine counts of second degree murder and
other related charges, Klvana appealed the jury verdict, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict, and claiming
error with regard to various evidentiary rulings. The California Court of
Appeals rejected all of Klvana's arguments and affirmed the judgment
against him. In its decision, the Court stated after reviewing the evidence,
"we conclude sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could
reasonably infer that Klvana was subjectively aware his methods of home
and office deliveries were life-endangering, but consciously and
deliberately disregarded these risks."' 0 3
The Court analyzed applicable statutes and noted "[s]econd degree
murder based on implied malice is committed when the defendant does
not intend to kill, but engages in conduct which endangers the life of
another, and acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life."-) An
essential distinction between second degree murder based on implied
malice and involuntary manslaughter based on criminal negligence is that
in the former, the defendant subjectively realizes the risk to human life
created by his conduct, whereas in the latter the defendant's conduct
objectively endangers life, but he does not subjectively realize the risk."0
Implied malice, like all other elements of a crime, may be proven by
circumstantial evidence."' Whether the evidence presented at trial is
direct or circumstantial, the relevant inquiry on appeal remains whether
any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond

See id.at 516-17.

'" Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 525.
'"Id, at 526.
"Id.; see also VEST'S ANN. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a).

"'Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526 (citing People v. Brito, 232 Cal. App. 3d. 316,321 fn.
4(1991)).
.lId. (citing People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d. 333, 346-347,233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P. 2d. 802
(1987)).
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a reasonable doubt.1 2 The Court of Appeals then concluded the jury was
presented with overwhelming evidence from which it could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that implied malice existed when Klvana
performed each delivery which formed the basis of the second degree
murder conviction.' 3 Klvana was sentenced to forty-five years to life for
three counts of second degree
murder and the Court of Appeals upheld the
1 14
court.
trial
the
of
sentence
UNITED STATES v. DONAL M. BILLIG
Commander Donal Billig was a cardiothoracic surgeon and the head of the
Cardiothoracic Surgery Department at Naval Hospital, Bethesda,
Maryland (Bethesda) from June, 1983 to March, 1985." ' Dr. Billig was
charged with twenty-four specifications of willful dereliction of duty
arising out of his alleged failure to have a supervisory surgeon present
during various open heart surgeries performed during the summer of
1983.116 He was also charged with five specifications alleging involuntary
manslaughter arising out of coronary artery bypass surgeries performed at
Bethesda between March, 1983 and November, 1984.117 This section will
focus on several instances of care that were the subject of charges brought
against Dr. Billig.
The Kas Operation
On October 29, 1984, Drs. Billig and Haggerson operated on Lieutenant
Colonel Kas (Kas). Kas was sixty-seven years old and had coronary
artery disease and aortic stenosis." 8 The surgery performed on Kas
involved replacing his aortic valve and installing two coronary artery
bypass grafts. Dr. Haggerson was the primary surgeon and Dr. Billig was

"2Klvana, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526 (citing People v. Towler, 31 Cal. 3d. 105, 118-119, 181
Cal. Rptr. 391, 641 P. 2d 1253 (1982)).
13Id.

" 4Id. at 531.
tIUnited States v. Donal M. Billig, 26 M.J. 744 (1988).
116
1d
17tId.
'"id.at 749. Aortic stenosis is a narrowing of the aortic valve which impedes the flow of
blood from the left ventricle into the aorta.
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the first assistant and supervisor.119 During the course of the operation, a
number of difficulties were encountered. 20
The first problem involved the inadvertent initial grafting of a
saphenous vein to a coronary vein rather than to a coronary artery.' 2 1 The
mistake was discovered and the bypass was then properly grafted to a
coronary artery.'2 This misidentification of a vein as an artery, however,
added about thirty minutes to the limited time that can be safely spent on
the cardiopulmonary bypass machine.' 3
The surgeons then preceded to replace the aortic valve. Difficulty
was encountered in getting the new valve seated properly in the aorta
because blood blocked the surgeons' field of vision. 24 Ultimately, the
surgeons successfully seated and tied down the new valve. 12s The aorta
was closed and the surgeons began to wean the patient off the bypass
machine. 26 In the process of coming off the bypass, the vent was
removed and the wound was closed by pulling the purse-string sutures
together. 127 During this procedure, however, some of the sutures tore
through the heart tissue and bleeding ensued.1 Kas was placed back onto
the bypass machine and the appropriate repairs were accomplished.' 9 As
the surgeons prepared to close the chest, the tear redeveloped."' Dr. Billig
elected to repair the bleeding site without putting the patient back onto the
bypass machine and he placed another pledgeted suture onto the area of
bleeding by lifting the heart to expose the apex and accomplish the
repair.'
The lifting of the heart, however, caused a drop in blood
pressure and damaged the myocardium (heart muscle), which became

19 1d.

' United States v. Donal M. Billig, 26 M.J. 744,749 (1988).
'Id.
A saphenous vein is described as a large, superficial blood vessel removed from the
leg and grafted onto the heart during bypass surgery to deliver blood around blocked coronary
arteries.
12id.

"Id. Blood is circulated throught a cardiopulmonary bypass machine during that portion
of the operation when the heart is stopped.
'United States v. Donal M. Billig, 26 M.J. 744,750-51 (1988).
l2 rd at 751.
1261d
127Id.

'"Billig, 26 M.J. at 750.
"OId.
13id. at 751.
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edematous (swollen).1 2 Because of the swelling, the patient's chest could
not be closed after repairs to the apex were completed. 33 The surgeons
decided to pack the chest with sterile dressing and bring the patient into
the intensive care unit to allow the cardiac function to stabilize and the
swelling to reduce. 34 It was anticipated that the swelling would dissipate
within forty-eight
to seventy-two hours, at which time the chest could be
35
closed.
safely
As Kas was being positioned for a chest x-ray, around 19:00 (7:00
136
p.m.), heavy bleeding from Kas's chest was discovered by a unit nurse.
At 19:30 Dr. Haggerson unpacked the chest and began replacing the
soaked dressings with new ones. 37 Dr. Billig arrived at 20:14 and
initiated attempts to stop the bleeding by suturing the apex of the heart. 138
When Dr. Billig began the suturing, however, Kas went into cardiac arrest,
requiring Dr. Haggerson to begin open heart massage. 139 After about
fifteen minutes of heart massage, Dr. Haggerson's thumb went through the
right ventricle and the patient exsanquinated 4 °
The Estep Case
Mr. Estep was a sixty-six-year-old retired United States Navy Petty
Officer with a long history of coronary artery disease which included two
previous heart attacks, the most recent of which occurred two months
prior to surgery.' 4' He was referred to surgery because of "significant
Tests
triple artery disease and impaired ventricular function."' 4'
performed prior to surgery revealed a severely damaged left ventricle with
total occlusion of at least two major coronary arteries."4' He underwent
quadruple bypass surgery on October 18, 1994 with Dr. Haggerson as the
primary surgeon and Dr. Billig as the first assistant and supervisor. 14
1321d.
1331d

"

134Billig 26 M.J. at 75 1.
5
13
6 1d.

" ld.
137Id
1381d.

139Billig 26 M.J. at 751.
1401d.

14'id.at 753.

1421d.

1431d.

l"Billig, 26 M.J. at 753.
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The initial surgical plan was to fashion a bridge graft (one saphenous
vein feeding two coronary arteries) from the aorta to the left anterior
descending artery (LAD) and then to the left diagonal artery.' 4' Separate
bypass grafts were also planned from the aorta to the right coronary artery
and circumflex coronary artery. 46 After grafting the first saphenous vein
to the left diagonal artery, the surgeons prepared to graft onto the LAD;
however, during preparation, they discovered the artery was too small to
properly accept a graft, and thus decided not to graft onto that artery.147
The opening was sewn shut, but bleeding continued. 48 Dr. Billig then
decided to ligate (tie off) the LAD altogether. 49 The remaining bypasses
were grafted apparently without incident, using saphenous veins with a
lumen (hollow opening) of approximately six millimeters grafted to
coronary arteries with lumens ranging between 1.3 and 2 millimeters.',
Estep was cared for in the intensive care unit (ICU) for four days
after surgery without serious complications.'' On the fifth day, however,
he went into cardiac arrest.'2 Dr. Haggerson began resuscitation efforts
by reopening the chest and starting open heart massage.153 After about
forty five minutes of massage, the patient's right ventricle eroded to the
point that Haggerson's thumb ruptured through the heart wall and the
patient died.'- 4
The Grubb Surgery
Major Grubb was a seventy-three-year-old retired United States Army
officer with a history of coronary artery disease and a previous heart
attack. ' Upon admission to Bethesda, he was suffering from severe
angina (chest pain) and tests performed prior to surgery revealed partial
occlusions of both the LAD and the diagonal artery, as well as the

14SId "

14id.
147Id.

148Id
'49Billig,26 M.J. at 753.
'"Id at 753-54.
1id. at 754.
15id.
13Id.

'Billig, 26 M.J. at 754.
"'Id.at 755.
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complete occlusion of the right coronary artery. 5 6 Grubb underwent
bypass surgery on August 8, 1984.117
The operation, like the others, was performed by Dr. Haggerson as
58
the primary surgeon and Dr. Billig as the first assistant and supervisor.1
Prior to surgery, two grafts were planned -- a single graft from the aorta
to the posterior descending branch of the right coronary artery, and a
bridge graft going sequentially to the LAD and to the left diagonal
artery.'59 During surgery it was decided instead to connect the single graft
from the right coronary artery to the LAD bridge graft, thereby creating0
a "Y" graft and leaving one saphenous vein feeding the three bypasses.16
After grafts were completed, the patient was successfully weaned off the
bypass machine.16' In short, the operation
proceeded well and was
62
completed without significant incident.1
Grubb entered the ICU at 15:00 (3:00 p.m.) and nurses' notes
reflected his condition was relatively stable until approximately 19:30
when his blood pressure started to drop. 63 Attempts initiated to increase
this pressure were largely unsuccessful and, at 20:50, Grubb went into
heart block and cardiac arrest occurred. 6' His pacemaker, which had not
been activated, was immediately turned on and his heart was restarted.16 5
Approximately one hour later, however,
Grubb's heart arrested again and
66
he died despite resuscitation efforts.
In the Kas case, Dr. Billig was charged with and convicted of
involuntary manslaughter.' 67 The Government alleged three main acts or

'561d. at 755-756.
"71d. at 756.

ISSd "
tSBillig, 26 M.J. at 756.

'60Id. There was conflicting testimony as to why the decision was made to use the "Y" graft
instead of the planned dual graft bypass. Dr. Haggerson testified that the "Y"graft was used
because the surgeons cut the saphenous vein too short, and thus the vein was not able to reach
from the coronary artery to the aorta. Dr. Billig testified, however, that the "Y" graft was used
because the aorta was discovered to be "tortuous and friable," that is, very brittle. Using the "Y"

graft, according to Dr. Billig, was necessary because he did not want to place two holes in the
fragile aorta.
161id

162
1Id.
63

1 Id.
aBillig,26 M.J. at 756.
1651da
Td.

...
Id.
at 75 1.

1997]

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE OR CRIMINAL MISTAKE

19

omissions by Dr. Billig constituted culpable negligence."' First, was his
"improper placing and repairing" of the left apex vent.1 9 Second, was his
"improperly identifying and grafting a saphenous vein graft to a coronary
vein rather than the posterior descending coronary artery."'7 The third
was his "improperly overmanipulating or improperly allowing to be
overmanipulated, the tissue of the heart, thereby wrongfully causing
inadequate myocardial
protection, excessive cardiac strain, edema, and
71
hemorrhage."'1
In the Estep case, Dr. Billig was charged wvith and convicted of the
culpably negligent killing of Estep by "improperly selecting or allowing
to be selected, saphenous vein conduits and coronary arterial connection
sites, improperly sewing or allowing to be improperly sewn, saphenous
vein connections, and improperly damaging or allowing to be improperly
damaged, the left anterior descending artery, thereby creating impeded
coronary artery perfusion."' The bulk of the prosecution's case centered
on two allegedly culpable acts -- Dr. Billig's decision to ligate the LAD,
and the improper sewing of the saphenous vein grafts to the coronary
arteries (the saphenous veins being too large in comparison to the
arteries), thus causing blood clotting, inadequate blood flow to the heart
and, ultimately, death.1'
In the Grubb case, Dr. Billig was charged with involuntary
manslaughter by "wrongfully fashioning or allowing to be wrongfully
fashioned, saphenous vein bypass conduits in such a manner that a small
conduit with an inadequate lumen was the only conduit connected to his
aorta." 74 He was found guilty of the lesser included offense of negligent
homicide.' 75
In addition to the foregoing, Billig's general court-martial
proceedings resulted in his being found guilty of twelve specifications of
willful dereliction of duty, four specifications of negligent dereliction of
duty and two specifications of dereliction of duty through culpable
16S1d.
169Billig, 26 M.J. at 751.
""°Id. at 751-52.

.mId. This over manipulation refers to the lifting of the heart during surgery, not the heart
massage in the ICU.
'7id. at 754.
13Id.

"4Billig, 26
17
sId.

M.J. at 756.
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inefficiency. 76 He was sentenced to confinement for four years, total
177
forfeiture of pay and allowances, and dismissal from the Naval Service.
Billig appealed his conviction and the reviewing court set aside the
findings of guilt and the sentence against him. All charges and
specifications against him were dismissed and all rights, privileges, and
property taken from Billig by the verdict against him were restored.' 78 In
overturning Billig's conviction, the reviewing court analyzed the evidence
against Billig and found it failed to support the verdict against him.
In the Kas case, the court rejected the notion that Billig's use of the
apex vent was per se improper stating:
Testimony from defense and government experts alike indicates
that the apex vent is an acceptable means of venting blood from the
heart, although it is not used extensively because of the risk of
uncontrollable bleeding and because of other less hazardous means
of achieving the same result. Simply because this vent has risks
inherent in its use, however, does not make its use improper.... In
short, Dr. Billig made an informed decision to use a vent which he
thought would do the best job with which he felt the most
comfortable under the circumstances. In such a situation, we
decline to substitute our judgment for that of a surgeon choosing
a medically acceptable surgical technique.' 79
In a footnote to this portion of its decision, the court adamantly
voiced its reluctance to "second guess" medical judgments made by
physicians intimately familiar with a patient's care stating:
Our refusal to second guess reasonable medical decisions made by
physicians in the course of surgery is closely analogous to our
refusal to question judgment calls made by attorneys during the
course of providing legal representation. We will not evaluate
strategic professional choices from hindsight, but from the

'1d.at 746. Billig was found not guilty in the deaths of Lt. Colnel Harold Coplan and Lois
Parent. Navy Surgeon Is ConvictedIn Deaths 0f3 Patients,N.Y. TLMEs, Feb. 27, 1986, Sec. A,
at 1.
17Id. at 746.
"81d. at 761.
"'Billig,26 M.J. at 752.
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perspective of the professional at the time such choices are made,
with the presumption that the conduct was reasonable."'
The court likewise found the evidence in the Estep case to be insufficient
to support the verdict against Billig. The court bluntly stated it "simply
[found] no negligence, gross or simple, on the part of Billig [in this
case]."' 8 ' Like the Kas case, the court analyzed the evidence and
concluded:
Both government and defense experts agree that the decision not
to graft onto the LAD was proper because if the graft had been
accomplished the blood flow to the left diagonal artery could have
been severely compromised. What is really in issue here is the
decision to ligate the artery after having chosen not to use it as part
of the bridge graft. It is important to note two critical factors in
this regard. First, the surgeons were faced with a bleeding artery
that was irreparable. Second, the LAD was completely occluded
above the sight of the incision and, therefore, there was no direct
blood flow feeding the left ventricular wall of the heart.... In fact,
the evidence shows that the surgeons acted properly throughout the
operation and that ligating the artery, under
these circumstances,
1 82
was the only reasonable course of action.
The court also analyzed the evidence regarding the suturing of the
saphenous veins in the Estep surgery, and likewise rejected the contention
that the vein grafting in this case was criminally negligent.1 83 The court
disagreed with the Government's contention that the bypass connections
were narrowed by poor suturing techniques and noted that the saphenous
veins were in fact tested by Dr. Haggerson during surgery and found to be
acceptable.'8 4
Finally, the court analyzed the evidence presented in the Grubb case
and concluded, "we do not know for certain what caused this patient's
death."' 5 The autopsy performed on Major Grubb listed the probable
"'Id (citing United States v. Scott, 24 M.I 186 (C.M.A. 1987), United State %.DiCup2,
21 M.J. 440 (C.M.A. 1986)).
81

' Billig, 26 M.J. at 754.

182Id.

i1d. at 755.

1Id.
'15Id. at 756.
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cause of death as being "attributed to a possible arythmia or metabolic
imbalance," and it stated that the saphenous vein grafts "were intact and
.patent," or in other words, were adequately sutured and open for blood
flow. ' 6 The court thereafter stated:
Given the confused and often conflicting nature of the evidence
presented at trial, we find it difficult, if not impossible, to
determine to any precise extent the cause of Major Grubb's death
except to say that it occurred after an operation that was supervised
by Dr. Billig. Criminal liability cannot flow from such a tenuous
relationship. '
The court went on to note that Dr. Haggerson, and not Dr. Billig, was the
primary surgeon and acutally performed the suturing complained of by the
Government as being the cause of Major Grubb's death.' 88 Nonetheless,
the record reflected the saphenous vein selected for the bypass, while
somewhat phlebosclerotic, was checked for adequate lumen and judged
to be acceptable, and that the grafts sutured by Dr. Haggerson were tested
prior to closure by means of both inserting probes into the graft and by
flushing cardioplegia solution throughout the newly constructed bypass
with good results. 8I 9 The court therefore dismissed this case stating it
"simply saw no negligent act on Dr. Billig's part that had anything to do
with the death of the patient."'9 0
A total of seven assignments of error were raised by Billig's
attorneys with regard to the trial and verdict rendered in this case.' 9' As
"6Billig, 26 M.J. at 757.
1881d.
189Id.
t"'Id"

'Itis worth noting that one issue raised on appeal was what the appellate court labelled the
"bad burgeon" theory of evidence. The court stated that the prosecution was permitted, over timely
objection, to introduce evidence from numerous witnesses and documents which essentially
amounted to a smear campaign to portray Dr. Billig as a bungling, one-eyed surgeon who should
have known better than even to enter an operating room because of his past mistakes and poor
eyesight. The court stated this tactic should not have been permitted by the military judge and
went on to state:
The appellant was forced not only to defend against the charges, but also
to explain and account for virtually all of his mistakes, professional setbacks, or
surgical misadventures during the previous 20 years. Although some of this
evidence may have been admissible to establish awareness of his surgical
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stated previously, the findings of guilty and the sentence were set aside.
In this regard, the court concluded its opinion by stating, "we are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the deaths that formed the basis
of the appellant's conviction were due to any negligence, simple or
otherwise, on his part."' 92
Newspaper reports provided insight into the impact Dr. Billig's
conviction had on his professional career. These reports indicated that
Billig lost his medical licenses in New York, Texas, Massachusetts, and
Pennsylvania as a result of his 1986 conviction. 93 Billig's statements
following his release from a military prison are likewise insightful:
It's my belief I've been precluded from any further clinical care
just by the nature of what's happened," Billig told a Washington
Post reporter several weeks after he was released from a military
prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he had served twentyfive months of a four-year sentence. "There's no way I can make
a decision on a patient, knowing you have to take risks.""'
In 1993, newspapers reported that Billig had his medical licenses
restored and had also obtained new unrestricted licenses in Maryland,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.!95 This same story indicated that
Billig was seeing patients six days a week as a partner in a seven-member
group practice in Virginia. 196 Billig's attorney indicated he was practicing
internal medicine and is not performing surgery because he "elected not

The appellant was forced not only to defend against the charges, but also
to explain and account for virtually all of his mistakes, professional setba!cks, or
surgical misadventures during the previous 20 years. Although some of this
evidence may have been admissible to establish awareness of his surgical
limitations, we are of the general opinion that as to much of this evidence,
Military Rules of Evidence 401,402,403 and 404 were either incorrectly applied
or were ignored altogether. This "bad surgeon" theory permeated the trial
proceedings and undoubtedly influenced the court members' decisions especially in light of the absence of a properly tailored limiting instruction by the
militaryjudge. Billig,26 MJ. at 75S.
I1d at 761.
93

' Sandra G. Boodman, FormerNavy Surgeon DonalBillig No%. PracticesIn Virginia,
WASH.1POST, Sept. 14, 1993, at Z15.
94Id.

19sId
196Id.
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to do it.'' 19 7 He had also received an honorable discharge and $120,000 in
back pay from the Navy.' 98
STATE OF UTAH v. DAVID R. WARDEN
David Warden was a licensed and board certified physician who had been
practicing family medicine in Kaysville, Utah, since 1968.1' 9 He also
provided obstetrical care and had attended approximately 2,500 births, 300
of which have been home deliveries. 2' At all times relevant to this case,
Warden lacked malpractice insurance, and therefore, did not have hospital
privileges and only delivered babies in home settings. 2 1'
In September, 1986, Warden was visited by Joanne Young, an
eighteen-year-old pregnant woman.20 2 In connection with her pregnancy,
she had previously seen Dr. Bitner, who had given her a complete
obstetric exam and estimated the date of delivery to be December 20,
1986.203 Dr. Bitner had scheduled Young for an ultrasound examination
in order to firmly establish the delivery date.204 Prior to the examination,
however, Young changed physicians because she wished to have a home
delivery.20 5 Warden, based on his examination of Young and medical
records received from Dr. Bitner, estimated the date of delivery to be
December 17, 1986.206 He did not perform an ultrasound to confirm this
date.20 7 Warden also decided Young was a suitable candidate for home
delivery.20 8
On the morning of November 7, 1986, approximately six weeks
before her delivery date, Young developed cramps and vaginal bleeding.
Ivy Young (Joanne's mother) phoned Warden and informed him of

9
1 7Id.

'"Id. This same story also states that, according to a Pentagon spokeswoman, the Navy paid
slightly more than $3 million to settle 18 malpractice claims brought by families of his patients.
His attorney is thereafter quoted as saying the Navy did not defend those claims properly.
'99State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
IMId.
20

Id.

203

Id.

204

Warden, 813 P.2d at 1146.

2OSId "
207

Id.
"

2081d "
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Joanne's condition.0 9 Warden told Ivy Young that her daughter was in
labor, not to worry,210 and to call back at 1:00 p.m.211 Ivy Young called
again at 1:00 p.m. and was told that it was not necessary to bring her
daughter to the clinic. 212 She called again at 4:00 p.m. and told Warden
that her daughter was having contractions and "losing blood clots."213 She
was then told to "stop fussing" and call back when the contractions were
three to five minutes apart.214 At 10:15 p.m., Ivy Young phoned Dr.
2 t5
Warden to inform him that her daughter was in the last stage of labor.
At no time during this interval did Warden examine Young to determine
if premature birth was likely and, if so, what precautions
should be taken
216
to minimize the likelihood of a premature birth.
Warden arrived at the Youngs' house at approximately 10:30 p.m.
that evening. Shortly thereafter, Young gave birth to a male infant 1 g The
infant was weighed on a bathroom scale and his weight was estimated to
be approximately four pounds.21 Soon after the birth, the newborn began
experiencing respiratory problems, as evidenced by a periodic grunting
sound the infant made while breathing and his purplish-blue color 1 9
Warden recognized that the infant was premature and showing symptoms
of respiratory distress syndrome - a disease that Warden knew was
progressive, linked to premature births, and could result in death3
Warden, however, did not inform the Youngs of the baby's condition and
positioned the infant in a way that would mask the symptoms, but would
not affect the condition itself.22 When asked if the baby needed to be
hospitalized, Warden said hospitalization was not indicated and that such
breathing patterns were normal in premature babies.m2 Ivy Young was
also concerned about the infant and repeatedly asked Warden whether the
209
21

Warden, 813 P.2d at 1146.

1id

211

1d"

213

1d.

214Warden,

813 P.2d at 1146.

21SId
216

1d.

2171d
219

Warden, 813 P.2d at 1149.
Id.

mId
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223 Warden's
attention."
baby needed "to be checked or [given] any other 224
'
baby.
the
only reply was "[N]o grandma, watch
At 11:40 p.m., approximately forty minutes after the birth, Warden
left the home.225 In instructing Ivy Young to watch the baby, Warden
allegedly did not tell her or anyone else in the household specifically what
the baby was suffering from a
to watch for, nor did he tell anyone
226
death.
in
result
could
that
condition
During the night, the infant's condition appeared to remain virtually
unchanged.2 7 The only perceivable difference was that his hands and feet
had turned a deeper shade of blue.? 8 At 8:00 a.m., however, the period of
silent breathing between the episodes of grunting respirations increased,
and Ivy Young became concerned that he may have stopped breathing. 2 9
Although she was not positive that the baby was no longer breathing, she
nonetheless attempted to revive him by gently rubbing his chest and
breathing into his face. 23 ° After a period of time, the infant let out a cry
and began a grunting respiration.23 ' She immediately attempted to call
Warden at his home and later at his office, without success. 23 2 She
succeeded, however, in contacting her clergyman, who came to her home
accompanied by a pediatrician, Dr. Kramer. The infant appeared to Dr.
Kramer to be near death. 233 The newborn was immediately transferred to
a nearby hospital, and was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.2 34 Ivy
Young did not take the baby to a hospital herself because she expected
Warden to arrive at any time and did not realize the seriousness of the
baby's condition.235
Both Warden's house and office were less then eight eight blocks
from the Young's home.236 Although, he awakened at 6:00 a.m. the

mId.at 1149.
Warden, 813 P.2d at 1149.
...

m2Id.

Z2Sld
"
z2'Id.
n8ld.

"9ld
Warden, 813 P.2d at 1149.

20
'

"3Id.

232Id.
2
331d.
34Id.
2SWarden, 813 P.2d at 1149.
2361d.
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following morning, he he made no attempt to contact his patients until
noon when, for the first time, he phoned the Youngs and was informed of
the infant's death. 7 A postmortem examination revealed the infant was
born approximately six to seven weeks premature and had died from
respiratory distress caused by prematurity of the lungs (hyaline membrane
disease). 8
Warden was charged with one count of negligent homicideYP Utah's
Annotated Code establishes that negligent homicide is committed when
24
a person "acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another."
Specifically, section 76-2-103 provides that a person acts:
[w]ith criminal negligence or is criminally negligent vith respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and
degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that the ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed by the actor's standpoint!"41
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial prior to the rendition of a verdict242
A second jury trial was held in February 1988, and Warden was convicted
as charged.243 Warden appealed and the Court of Appeals of Utah
reversed his conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeals concluded the
evidence failed to establish criminal negligence. 2" The State challenged
the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court reversed
and upheld the jury verdict and criminal conviction of Dr. Warden.245

2 7

d.

2"State of Utah v. Warden, 784 P.2d. 1204 (Utah App. 1989).
239

1d

24OWarden, 813 P. 2d. at 1150-51.
241
1d. at 1151.
242Warden,
784 P. 2d. at 1206.
243
1d.
'4Id at 1209. Since it concluded that the evidence failed to establish criminal ncgligcnce,
the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue raised as to whether defendant's acts or omissions
were the legal cause of death.
2451 arden, 813

P. 2d. at 1146.
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STATE OF NEW YORK v. GERALD EINA UGLER, M.D.
One of the most widely reported cases is that of New York internist,
Gerald Einaugler.2 46 Dr. Einaugler was caring for a woman, Alida
LaMour, who had been admitted to a nursing home in May, 1990. Ms.
LaMour was terminally ill, suffering from kidney failure, when she was
transferred from a Brooklyn hospital to an adjacent nursing home. Dr.
Einaugler mistakenly identified Ms. LaMour's peritoneal dialysis catheter
for a gastrostomy feeding tube and directed that Ms. LaMour be fed
through the peritoneal dialysis catheter. 47 Ms. LaMour received
numerous feedings through the dialysis catheter before the mistake was
discovered by a nurse approximately thirty-six hours later.248 The feeding
solution was drained off and Ms. LaMour was reportedly stable when the
nurses notified Dr. Einaugler of the mistake.249 It has also been reported
that Dr. Einaugler examined Ms. LaMour three times that day.250 Dr.
Einaugler also called the chief nephrologist at the hospital where Ms.
LaMour received dialysis. 25 ' Appellate decisions on this case state the
' 22
nephrologist advised Dr. Einaugler to "get the patient into the hospital.
The same nephrologist later "clarified" his testimony, saying he told Dr.
Einaugler only to monitor the patient and that Dr. Einaugler followed his
advice responsibly.253 The evidence also suggested that although Dr.
Einaugler knew that peritonitis could be fatal if untreated, he did not order
Ms. LaMour's transfer to the hospital for more than ten hours after his
conversation with the nephrologist. 2 4 Upon admission to the hospital,
Ms. LaMour was diagnosed with peritonitis and she died four days later.2"
Interestingly, no autopsy was performed and no official cause of death
was stated.256

246

People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 424, 208 A.D. 2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).

247

1d. at 946-7.

248
1d.
249

1d.

20Id.

3
2s
Einaugler,208 A.D.2d at 947.
S2Id
2 3
1 Mark Crane, MalpracticeIs Not Criminal;Mistake Is?, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 1997, at

A17.

2'54Einaugler,208 A.D.2d at 947.
2s d.
256
Id..
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A New York State Medical-Conduct Board reviewed this case and
cleared Dr. Einaugler.2 7 The State Medical-Conduct Board found that
although Dr. Einaugler mistook the dialysis catheter as a feeding tube, its
resemblance to a feeding tube led to his mistake.2 3 The Medical-Conduct
Board also found the hospital had failed to send crucial paperwork to the
nursing facility at the time of Ms. LaMour's admission. 9
Prosecutors were not satisfied with this result. Charges were filed
against Dr. Einaugler and he was convicted of a misdemeanor for willful
violation of the New York health laws which prohibit the commission of
"an act of neglect. '' 260 The term "neglect" is defined by the New York
State Department of Health Regulations as:
Failure to provide timely, consistent, safe, adequate and
appropriate services, treatment and/or care to a patient or resident
of a residential healthcare facility vhile such patient or resident is
under the supervision of the facility, including, but not limited to:
nutrition, medication, therapies, sanitary clothing and
surroundings, and activities of daily living.26'
The jury also convicted Dr. Einaugler of reckless endangerment in the
second degree.262 Dr. Einaugler appealed the jury's verdict, and a divided
appellate court upheld Dr. Einaugler's conviction.263 As a result of his
conviction, Dr. Einaugler was sentenced and ordered to spend fifty two
weekends in jail at Rikers Island.264
In the summer of 1997, Governor George Pataki commuted the
sentence of Dr. Einaugler. 26' The Governor ordered that instead of the
fifty two weekends in jail, Dr. Einaugler should serve fifty two days of
community service as a physician. 66

'"See, e.g., Esther B. Fein, Doctor In Negligence Case Gets His Sentence Eascd,N.Y.
TnES, June 28, 1997, Sec. 1, at 25.
25
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STATE OF WISCONSIN v. CHEM-BIO CORPORATION
In March, 1995, at the age of twenty-nine, Karen Smith died of cervical
cancer. Her death and the death of another Milwaukee woman resulted in
criminal charges being brought against Chem-Bio Corporation. In 1987,
Karen Smith began experiencing mild postcoital bleeding, 267 and went to
her health maintenance organization (HMO) physician for an exam. A
physician's assistant took a pap smear and sent it off to Chem-Bio
Laboratory and, several days later, the results came back as normal.2 68
Karen's symptoms persisted and, a year later, another pap smear came
back normal. 269 The HMO referred Karen to a gynecologist who did a
biopsy of Karen's cervix to test it for cancer. 270 At that time, a diagnosis

of hyperplasia was made.27' Four months later, the bleeding returned.272
Karen's physicians took a second biopsy. 273 Like the others, this test was
sent to Chem-Bio and was interpreted as negative.274

Physicians

suggested Karen stop using birth control pills as they might be irritating
her cervix.275

Over the next twelve months, Karen's bleeding grew more frequent
and heavier, sometimes lasting for weeks.276 In June, Karen passed out

twice after a volleyball game.277 She had been bleeding continuously for
twenty-one days.2 78 Karen went to her clinic where they recommended
another pap smear and biopsy, her third in two years.279 The gynecologist

stated he had seen her negative lab tests and assured her she did not have
cancer.280 Karen's symptoms persisted and she again went to see the

'7See Jan DeBlieu, I'sA Crime. MisreadPap Smears Led To Death, HEALTH, July 1996,
at 82.
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gynecologist who tried repeatedly to stop the bleeding by cauterizing the
cervical tissue.281
After four years of bleeding, three pap smears and three biopsies,
Karen Smith went to see a different gynecologist not affiliated with her
HMO.2 Another biopsy was done and sent out to a lab other than ChemBio 3 The results were unquestionable: cancer.2
With the help of a medical malpractice attorney, Karen and her
husband settled a lawsuit for 6.3 million dollars 5 In the fall of 1994,
Karen asked the Milwaukee District Attorney to investigate potential
criminal charges. 8-6 News reports of this case provide details of facts
leading up to the criminal charges being filed. 8 7 One such story begins
by identifying Betty Setum, a woman who began supervising work at
Chem-Bio in 1990.288 This story stated:
Reading a Pap smear accurately is difficult even for the best
cytotechnologists, as technicians trained to read Pap smears are
called. Each slide may contain as many as 300,000 cells; when
cancer is present, only a few may have the darkened center or
malformed shape indicating the disease. It's like searching for a
few odd blossoms in a roomful of flowered wallpaper.
For that reason, cytotechnologists need about five minutes to
check a Pap smear slide, according to the College of American
Pathologists. The work is so painstaking that professional
guidelines have long recommended cytotechnologists read no more
than 100 slides a day. In 1990, federal law set the limit at 120
slides, but concerns about accuracy caused the government to cut
the limit to 100 slides a day in 1992.
A few days after Setum began work at the lab, June Fricano,
a freelance cytotechnologist.told her to be especially careful with
slides that had case numbers ending in 2; those were the ones that
would be rescreened for quality control. "My jawv hit the floor,"
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Setum says. "Quality control is supposed to be random. If its not,
there's no point in doing it."
Then, in January 1991, Setum noticed a stack of 160 slides in
Fricano's work area. Half had been marked with the next day's
date, making it appear that she hadn't exceeded the legal limit.
Setum had the slides rescreened. One, which Fricano had marked
as normal, showed clumps of ominous dark cells. Fricano was
fired that week.
A month later, Setum took a phone call from the medical
secretary at a nearby hospital.
Physicians performing a
hysterectomy on a thirty-nine-year-old woman had discovered
advanced cervical cancer. Could they check her previous Pap
smears? Setum pulled a 1987 Pap smear from the files and had it
examined. "There were almost no normal cells on it," she says
quietly. "Cancer's ugly. It's black and horrible. It was the worst
thing I've ever seen."
That Pap smear belonged to Dolores Geary, a physical
therapy aide and mother of three who also belonged to Family
Health Plan Cooperative. She would become the second homicide
victim in Michael McCann's criminal case. The slide had been
read, and reported as normal, by June Fricano.
Fricano, it turned out, had screened more than 48,000 Pap
smears in a year -- four times the safe caseload. For her speedy
work, she was paid $2 a slide, earning $96,000 at a time when top
staff cytotechnologists made $33,000. Her mistakes were never
detected, perhaps because she knew which slides would be
rescreened for quality control." 9
On April 7, 1995, District Attorney Michael McCann took his
evidence of reckless homicide to a Milwaukee inquest jury.2 9 The inquest
jury came back with an unprecedented recommendation: charge Chem-

Bio, June Fricano, and Robert Lippo, the head of the laboratory, with
" ' McCann decided against prosecuting Fricano and
reckless homicide.29
2
9
2
Lippo.
"There was no criminal intent on any individual's part,"
McCann stated, 93 however, McCann charged Chem-Bio with two counts
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ofreckless homicide.2 94 In December, 1995, Chem-Bio pleaded no contest
to the charges and paid the maximum legally allowable fine of
$20,000.00.291

STATE OF COLORADO v. JOSEPH VERBRUGGE, M.D.
On July 8,1993, an eight-year-old boy, Richard Leonard, underwent minor
ear surgery at a Denver hospital. The anesthesiologist during this
operation was Dr. Joseph Verbrugge. During surgery, Richard's vital
signs indicated serious trouble: his heart rate and temperature soared and
the carbon dioxide level in his blood was dangerously high. Verbrugge,
fifty-six, was accused of falling asleep during the operation 9 6 and failing
to notice drastic changes in the boy's condition that led to a fatal heart
attack.297 When he died, Richard Leonard's had a temperature of 107
degrees, and he had four times the normal amount of carbon dioxide in his
blood 98 Shortly after Richard's death, prosecutors in Denver fied
criminal charges against VerBrugge.
A jury found Dr. VerBrugge guilty of "grossly negligent medical
care." 299 In so doing, the jury found VerBrugge's conduct to be "an
extreme deviation from generally accepted standards of practice." '
Grossly negligent medical care in Colorado is a class 2 misdemeanor with
a maximum penalty of twelve months in jail and a $1,000.00 flne. " ' The
jury, however, deadlocked 10-2 for conviction on a count of criminally
negligent homicide.30 2 The Denver district judge declared a mistrial on
that charge. 03
While Dr. VerBrugge awaited retrial on the count of criminally
negligent homicide, he moved from the state of Colorado and sought a
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medical license in New Mexico. 304 Newspaper reports indicate he
withdrew his application in December, 1995 after it garnered widespread
news coverage. 0 5 These same news reports indicate an official with the
Colorado Board of Medical Examiners told the newspaper that, even if
VerBrugge were convicted on the more serious charge (criminally
negligent homicide), it wouldn't automatically result in a revocation of his
license, although it would be considered.0 6
THE CASE OF THE COLORADO NURSES
In 1997, three nurses in Colorado were charged with criminally negligent
homicide in relation to a death last year of a day-old baby at a Denver
hospital. 7 Reports of this case indicate the charges were brought against
all three nurses despite the fact that two of the three nurses had already
been disciplined by the board of nursing.0 8
In April, 1997, an Adams County grand jury issued the indictments
of the 3 nurses who were accused of causing the death of Miguel Angel
Sanchez on October 16, 1996.309 Miguel was allegedly born healthy on
October 15, but died the next day shortly after being injected with an oilbased penicillin,31 ° given as a precaution against an infection his mother
had. 3 ' The drug, at ten times the physician's prescribed dosage, was
312
allegedly injected into the baby's vein instead of into his hip muscle.
A hospital pharmacist misinterpreted and improperly dispensed the order,
however, she did affix a label indicating it was to be injected into the
muscle. '13 One of the nurses allegedly consulted with another of the
defendant nurses who changed the route of administration to
intravenous.3" 4
30
Shonda Novak, Denver Anesthesiologist Ponders Future Afier Conviction, ALBURQUERQE
TRiB., Oct. 23, 1996, at A8.
3
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Under Colorado law, criminally negligent homicide is defined as a
gross deviation from the standard of care that causes the death of another
person?. 5 In Colorado, punishment for the class 5 felony usually ranges
from one to three years injail3 16 The minimum sentence under mitigating
circumstances is six months and the maximum sentence under aggravating
circumstances is six years.317 Also there is a fine of up to S 100,000.00.318
The attorney for one of the nurses reportedly called the indictments a
public relations stunt by the Adams County District Attorney who decided
319
to present the case to the grand jury.
On January 30, 1998, a jury exonerated nurse Kathy King by finding
her not guilty of criminally negligent homicide in relation to the death of
Miguel Angel Sanchez.32 The two other nurses involved in the incident
had previously pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide.'
Newspaper reports indicate that the two nurses will not face any jail time
and will receive a deferred judgment when sentenced, meaning the case
will be wiped off their records if they successfully complete probation and
public service requirements?'
THE CASE OF THE NEW JERSEY NURSES
A New Jersey judge has intervened in a case involving attempts to have
criminal charges brought against five Middlesex County nurses accused
of endangering the welfare of a stroke patient who died. n According to
the indictment, statements by Prosecutor Robert Gluck, and evidence in
the record of the civil case, the nurses allegedly waited too long during the
early morning of October 22, 1996, to call a physician to treat Isaac
Baron; a seventy-four-year-old stroke patient whose condition was
deteriorating. 324 Baron was a- stroke patient at Warren Hospital in

31SId
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3' Michael Romano, Nurses FearIndicdments Put Profession On Trial- Charge In Infant's
Accidental DeathAre A FirstIn Colorado,ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 30, 1997, at 28A.
32'1-m ROCKY MouNTAN NEvs, Jan. 31, 1998, p. 38A.
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Phillipsburg until he was transferred to Roosevelt Care Center on October
1, 1996.325 Upon the transfer, he was still in very ill health, and his
discharge summary from Warren Hospital put Roosevelt on notice to be
careful about Baron's sensitivity to one of his drugs, Coumadin, a blood
thinner.326 Coumadin prevents life-threatening clotting in stroke patients,
but there is danger that the drug will work too well, causing the blood to
become unable to clot rendering even the the slightest bruise to cause
possible internal bleeding.327 A blood test that shows a high "prothrombin
time," or PT, means the blood is taking too long to clot and that Coumadin
should be held or replaced with other drugs.328
According to the nurses' notes for October 19 through 21, Baron was
alert and responsive, as he had been throughout his stay in Roosevelt.329
But his condition worsened when he returned from a brief visit to JFK
Medical Center for a barium swallow x-ray.330 First, according to a note
by charge nurse Mary Ann Hoyda at 5:30 p.m., a physician ordered a hold
3 31
on Coumadin until further notice because Baron's PT was 31.8 seconds.
Further, tests were to be done the next day, the nurse noted.332 Then came
the damaging notes, from midnight to 6:45 a.m., by the next shift's charge
nurse, Rose Tubens.333 The notes included such comments as, "resident
found unresponsive and lethargic, color pale, skin warm and dry,
small amount of brownish mucus
respiration labored, oxygen applied ...
incontinence of bowel and bladder. 3 34 The notes say
noted from mouth ...
Baron was cleaned, changed, tube fed, and his blood pressure was charted
as eighty over fifty, which is extremely low. 335 Finally, the notes show
that at 6:45 a.m., at the direction of another physician, an emergency call
was made and Baron was taken to JFK Medical Center at 7:25 a.m. 336 He

3
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died at 10:30 a.m., and according to an autopsy, he bled to death. 337 The
pathologist found3382,000 to 3,000 cubic centimeters of blood in his
abdominal cavity.
On March 25, 1997, the nurses were indicted on charges of
endangering the welfare of an elderly person in their care, a fourth-degree
crime with a potential penalty of eighteen months in jail and a S7,500.00
fine.339 Superior Court Judge Robert Figarotta decided that the nurses
qualified for PTI, the "go-and-sin-no-more" dismissal of charges against
normally law-abiding people who make one mistake and are not likely to
transgress again.340 The lawyer for the Baron family reportedly said the
family of Isaac Baron was upset, not so much about the PTI offer, but
about the particular deal with the nurses.3' The nurses' defense attorneys
state there will be no admission of guilt or other conditions, just a
requirement that the nurses stay out of trouble for a year. 34" According to
published reports, the civil ease involving this death was still going
forward and the state ombudsman was urging the state Board of Nursing
to discipline the nurses.343
PEOPLE v. WOLFGANG SCHUG, M.D.
On February 23, 1996, Rhoda Thomas walked into the emergency room
of Redbud Community Hospital carrying Cody Burrows, her elevenmonth-old son. Cody had been vomiting and Rhonda and her husband,
Cody's parents, were worried. Dr. Wolfgang Schug examined Cody,
diagnosed an ear infection, and prescribed amoxicillin, an antibiotic?'
Cody initially improved, and his parents even took him to watch a cousin
play basketball the next day, a Saturday. 34 But later that night, he grew
sicker, prompting his parents to return to the emergency room before
dawn on Sunday. 346 A physician on duty performed a blood test,
3371d
33
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diagnosed a gastrointestinal ailment, advised the parents to give him
Pedialyte, an electrolyte solution to prevent dehydration, and told them to
return if the baby did not improve.347 All sides agreed the blood test
results were not alarming.348
Shortly before noon on Sunday, the exhausted family rushed back to
the emergency room after Cody's mother noticed her son's eyes appeared
to be "sinking in.3 49 For almost three days, Cody had been vomiting, had
351
°
diarrhea, and could not hold food down." Schug again was on duty. 352
Cody had a high fever and Schug ordered a tepid bath and a chest x-ray.
The baby also was vomiting something that looked like dried coffee
grounds -- blood, according to the medical records and grand jury
transcripts.353
The emergency room was busy; Schug said he probably saw twentyseven patients during the eight and one-half hours Cody was there.354
While in the bath, Cody put his mouth under the running faucet to drink
the water.355 Schug recalled that a nurse called him over to see how cute
the splashing child looked.356 Schug357would write in the records that the
baby had been "playful" in the bath.
Delbert Thomas, Cody's grandfather, told Schug his grandson needed
"some kind of intravenous or something. 35 8 Schug told him to look at
Cody's tongue; 359 it was wet, so he wasn't dehydrated, according to
Schug. 6 Medical records show, five hours after the baby arrived, Schug
31
and the nurses began looking for a vein to draw blood and insert an IV.
"Everybody and his brother looked at him to try and start an IV," Michael
Hegele, a hospital laboratory technician, testified.362
347
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Finally Schug obtained blood, but no one could get an IV into Cody,
witnesses said.363 Schug briefly consulted by phone with a Redbud
pediatrician, who later said he had no idea how ill the baby was. 6,
Cody by now appeared "totally lethargic, not conscious very much
...
zonked," recalled Hegele. 361 "I mean his head was rolling .... "c The
blood test revealed three measurements that the technician called "panic"
levels, a huge unexplained deterioration from fourteen hours earlier.3 6 A
physician who later examined the records said Cody's kidneys had shut
down. 368 "The lab values were way out of line and were hard to believe,"
Schug recalled, noting that some textbooks say such changes cannot occur
so rapidly.3 69 He said he knew the baby needed hospitalization and called
a pediatrician at Santa Rosa Community Hospital, fifty-five miles away37
Redbud has no pediatric ward.37 1
"How does the baby look?" the pediatrician asked. 3 "He can sit up
and drink from a bottle," the pediatrician said Schug told him?' The
baby had just ingested three ounces in the emergency room. 37 4 "Then
there must be something wrong with your lab," the pediatrician suggested,
according to the grand jury transcripts. 375 They decided Cody should go
to Santa Rosa by car.376
Schug did not ask for an ambulance or helicopter because he said he
thought a private car would be fastest.3 "7 During the prior three months,
transfers had been delayed an average of seventy-five minutes each in
waiting for ambulances, and helicopters were used only in extreme cases,
Schug said 3 78 "He certainly didn't look critical or lethargic in the medical
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sense," said Schug, "or like he was
going downhill so rapidly that he
379
didn't even have an hour or two.
Cody still had a fever and was breathing rapidly, medical records
show. ° The emergency room nurse allegedly testified she so feared for
Cody that she considered telling the parents to lie to Schug and claim they
had no car.8 On the transfer form, the nurse described Cody as lethargic
and "mottled to the extremities," evidence of extreme dehydration. 2
"M.D. aware," she added.383
Schug handed the parents a map and a bottle of Pedialyte for their
journey.384 Cody's father drove quickly over the mountain roads -- but not
fast enough to save his son.38 The drive took an hour and twenty
minutes.386 As Cody's mother handed him to a nurse, she suddenly
realized her baby was not breathing.387 Physicians at two hospitals tried
388
to save the boy, but his condition had deteriorated beyond all hope.
Cody was taken off life support the following day.389
A coroner attributed the cause of death to "anoxic
encephalopathy." 39 ° The brain had succumbed because of lack of oxygen
"due to sepsis," a massive infection and severe dehydration "due to otitis
media," the ear infection.'
Eighteen months later, Schug received a call from his wife while he
was in the emergency room. 39 Investigators had been at the house and
were en route to the hospital.393 Schug, the only physician on duty,
opened a back door and let them in.394 A nurse listening in an adjoining
room said she felt she "was in a dream" when she overheard an officer
read Schug his rights and tell him the charge: a grand jury had indicted
379
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him for second-degree murder.39 ' Schug also was charged with
involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment. 396 "I can't leave here,"
the stunned physician told the officers. 397 "I have to take care of my
patients.""39 Still clad in his blue scrubs, the physician was handcuffed
and placed in a patrol car.?

The criminal case against Dr. Schug went to trial in February, 1998.
Newspapers covering this trial reported that in opening statements, Deputy
Attorney General Vernon Pierson told the jury that Schug, after keeping
Cody in the emergency room about eight hours, finally realized the baby
was seriously ill, and out of concern for his professional reputation tried
to conceal it.' Pierson reportedly said the baby desperately needed
fluids, but Schug waited too long to try to insert an IV and refused to
summon help from an on-call surgeon because he did not want to admit
he had misjudged the boy's condition.4"'
This same newspaper article noted statements by Schug's attorneys
that defense medical experts would testify that Cody was probably
suffering from a "rotovirus," a type of intestinal infection that strikes
500,000 children a year in the United States and causes 300 to 400
deaths. Schug's lawyer also reportedly stated that experts would testify
that Cody suffered from kidney failure, and if Schug had tried to give him
fluids intravenously
at Redbud, the baby probably would have died
403
there.
On February 20, 1998, Lake County Superior Court Judge Robert
Crone acquitted Schug on a defense motion and dismissed the jury after
ruling that the prosecution had not presented substantial evidence of
criminal conduct to support the charges.' This same newspaper story
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reported that Schug faced fifteen years to life if convicted and had
borrowed heavily to pay for his defense, which has cost about $140,000.405
OTHER RECENT PROSECUTIONS
Dr. Bruce Saul Steir
On December 13, 1996, Sharon Hamptlon of Barstow, California, was
five months pregnant when she went to A Lady's Choice Women's
Medical Center in Moreno Valley, California, for an abortion.40 6 Dr.
Bruce Saul Steir completed the procedure and Hamptlon left the clinic at
approximately 5:45 p.m. 407 Hamptlon's mother drove her home, but
could not wake her when they arrived in Barstow around eight o'clock
that evening." The family called paramedics, but Hamptlon was dead
before she reached Barstow Community Hospital.4 '
An autopsy
determined she bled to death after her uterus was perforated during the
abortion."' Newspapers reported Steir was scheduled to appear on
February 3, 1998 for a preliminary hearing in Riverside County Superior
Court on charges of murder.411 These same newspaper reports indicate
Steir's license was revoked by the California Medical Board in March of
1998.2 When Hamptlon died, Steir was on probation because of a string
of problems in previous abortions and was practicing without a mentor
physician, as required under the terms of probation.
Dr. Patrick Chavis
In Los Angeles County, California, Dr. Patrick Chavis is reportedly
accused of botching a liposuction procedure, killing a forty-three-year-old
woman.4 3 The physician left his office to check on another patient who
suffered complications after a liposuction the previous day, said Deputy
District Attorney Brian Kelberg, who is prosecuting the case.414
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Dr. Guillermo Falconi
In San Bernardino County, California, an unlicensed physician was
charged with murder after a Rancho Cucamonga, California woman died
a
in June from a liposuction procedure Falconi performed in her home.""
U.S.A. v. C. Douglas Wood, LD.
Nearly four years after the death of an elderly patient at a Veterans
Hospital in Oklahoma, his physician has been indicted on charges of
intentionally killing the man with a fatal injection.4" 6 Dr. C. Douglas
Wood, former chief of surgery at the Muskogee, Oklahoma Veterans
Hospital, was charged with first-degree murder on January 13, 1998 for
the February, 1994 death of Virgil Dykes. 4 7 The federal grand jury
indictment says that Wood "willfully" and "deliberately" killed Dykes by
injecting him with potassium chloride. 48 Dykes was eighty-six years old;
Wood, who is sixty-years old, worked at the hospital since 19SO.4t In
May, 1998, a United States District Court jury found Dr. Wood guilty of
involuntary manslaughter. Motions after verdict are pending."'
FOREIGN PROSECUTIONS
One should not conclude that the criminal prosecution of health care
providers for "negligent" acts is a phenomenon unique to the United
States. Other countries have had similar cases brought against health care
providers thereby introducing an "international" element to this
controversial topic.
New Zealand
Regina v.
l involved criminal charges being brought against
a physician for a fatal error. Dr. Yogasakaran was an anaesthetist who
noticed his patient was experiencing difficulty breathing and decided to
Yogasakaran4
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inject her with the drug, Dopram. 22 He opened the right drawer of the
anesthetics trolley and extracted an ampuole of a drug from the section
marked with the name "Dopram.' A' 23 Unknown to the physician, another
member of the staff had inserted the wrong drug into this section of the
anesthetics trolley. 424 As a result, the patient was injected with Dopamine
which caused her death. 425 Dr. Yogasakaran did not read the label of the
drug he was injecting, assuming that it was correct because it had come
from the right place in the anesthetics trolley. 26 Expert evidence at trial
led to the conclusion that an anesthetist should read the label of every drug
before it is injected, even in an emergency. 427 On this basis, Dr.
Yogasakaran was held to have been negligent and was subsequently
convicted of manslaughter."428
Saudi Arabia
In Saudi Arabia, newspapers reported on a criminal case involving a
physician and the death of his patient. This newspaper story indicates that
in 1996, a medical commission inquiring into the death of a woman after
her discharge from Shaqra hospital accused the treating physician of
negligent homicide and ordered him to pay SR50,000 in blood money plus
other fines. 4"29 Ministry of Health officials said the blood money was paid
to relatives of the deceased woman, and the erring physician has been
suspended. 430
ANALYSIS
This Article provides detailed examples of cases in the past and present
involving criminal charges brought against health care providers for
alleged fatal mistakes and clinical negligence. What is becoming obvious
is that medicine, previously thought to being immune from criminal
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prosecution, is now becoming increasingly subject to scrutiny by district
attorneys and prosecution in criminal courts.
A FAILURE OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
TO "POLICE" ITS OVN?
Why is there is this increase of criminal prosecution of health care
providers for clinical mistakes and fatal errors? Some have pointed to the
failure of state medical licensing boards, peer review panels, and other
watchdog agencies to police the medical profession and mete out harsh
discipline when a case calls for it. For example, a study in New Jersey
found that 3 to 10 percent of the 26,965 physicians licensed to practice
medicine in that state were either incompetent or impaired; but just a
handful, about one-half of one percent, ever get disciplined. This study
also found that even fewer physicians lose their medical license. For
example, as mentioned previously, the Colorado State Medical Board
indicated it was not certain what disciplinary measures, if any, would be
43
taken with regard to Dr. Joseph VerBrugge. '
Some have pointed to the murder case brought against Dr. David
Benjamin as proof that medical self-policing is inadequate. Dr. Benjamin
was found guilty of second degree murder, and sentenced to the maximum
of twenty-five years to life, after a patient bled to death following a
botched second trimester abortion.43 According to the proof at the trial,
the patient suffered a three and one-half inch tear in her cervix and vagina
and was left on an operating table in the clinic. 33 Documents showed Dr.
Benjamin had formerly practiced upstate under the name of Dr. Elyas
Bonrouhi, where he had been disciplined for five other bungled medical
procedures in the mid-1980s. 4M He changed his name and moved to the
New York area during the state Medical Board's investigation.4 35 Dr.
Benjamin's license had been revoked by the Board one month before his
1993 arrest, but because the revocation was on appeal, he was allowed to
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continue to practice medicine and performed the abortion that led to
murder charges.436
These types of incidences and statistics provide ammunition for
interested citizens and consumer groups to call for the continued criminal
prosecution of health care providers. An Illinois medical-consumer
advocacy group reportedly cited statistics suggesting the Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) was failing in its efforts to
"police" physicians in that state. Families Advocating Injury Reduction
(FAIR) was quoted as stating that since 1985, the amount DPR has spent
on medical oversight has grown by 512 percent, but the agency has
disciplined fewer and fewer physicians each year for "quality-of-care"
violations such as gross negligence, violations of confidentiality, and
unethical conduct.437 According to FAIR (between 1990 and 1993), the
number of quality-of-care complaints DPR received grew from 622 to
801, while citations dropped from sixty-two to eight during the same
period.438 These statistics led FAIR to call for a complete program audit
of DPR by the state auditor general to look at the timeliness of
investigations and the adequacy of procedures.439 Concerns were also

raised as to Illinois' system of having only physicians decide the fate of
wayward members of their own profession. 40 This Illinois system of
allowing two non-voting public members to sit in on meetings was
described as "fairly unusual" when compared with other states, such as
New York, which has a five-member review board, two members
of
44 1
which are "consumer representatives" with full voting power.
The medical profession has responded to this criticism. It contends
that disciplinary proceedings are on the rise. A report issued by the
Federation of State Medical Boards indicated that in 1994, there was an
11.8 percent increase over 1993 in the number of physicians who had their
licenses revoked or suspended, and the total number of disciplinary
actions increased by 38 percent. 442 A more recent report of the Federation
436
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of State Medical Boards concluded that state medical boards took 4,432
disciplinary actions against 3,880 physicians in 1996. 4 The disciplinary
actions were divided into two types -- prejudicial and nonprejudicial."
Prejudicial actions, in turn, were divided into three categories:
(A) loss of licensure or loss of licensed privilege,
(B) restriction of license or licensed privilege, and
(C) other prejudical actions."
In 1996, there were 1,607 category A violations, 1,261 category B
violations, and 953 category C violations for a total of 3,821 prejudical
actions.' 4
State medical boards also took 611 non-prejudicial, or
administrative, actions. 447 The Federation president stated state medical
boards have taken more disciplinary action since 1991 and noted there was

a 4.5 percent increase from 1995 to 1996 in serious prejudicial actions
involving revocation, suspension, or restriction of medical licenses. 3
The State of New York has also taken steps to improve its method of
disciplining physicians. Under new legislation, a physician whose license
has been revoked or suspended is not allowed to continue practicing

medicine while appealing the ruling, and the disciplinary action is made
public.4 9 In addition, the legislation seeks to speed up the lengthy process
of taking disciplinary action against a physician who has been convicted
of a felony or had a license suspended or revoked in another state.450 The

"Kelly McMurry, DisciplineAgainst PhysiciansBy State McdicalBoards Incrcxcd In
1996, TRIAL, June 1997, at 50-82.
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of prejudicial behavior.
46d
"'Id. These actions typically were license denials based on inadequate qualifications or
denials of reinstatements following disciplinary action.
"'IdIncluded in the Federation's summary is a statistical calculation used to aess each
board's disciplinary activity. Computed since 1991, this statistic - the Composite Action Index
(CAI) - averages four activity ratios that measure disciplinary activity. The 1996 CAI increased
17.4 percent from 1995. Based on the 61 licensingjurisdictions that supplied data for both years,
36 boards improved their CAI's by an average of about 64 percent in 1996, while 25 boards saw
a decrease averaging 21 percent from 1995.
"Harvy
Lipman, PatakiSeeks Rules ForDoctors,TM.ES UNION, June 6, 1996, at B2.
4501d

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

(Vol. 2:1

legislation also streamlines the disciplinary process by allowing additional
charges of physician misconduct to be brought during an ongoing
investigation.45 ' Previously, new charges could only be raised in a
seperate disciplinary action. 452
CRITICISMS OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Representatives of the medical profession and other commentators have
blasted the manifest unfairness which accompanies the criminal
prosecution of health care providers for their clinical mistakes and fatal
errors.453 In the Einaugler case, an amicus brief was filed with the
appellate court on behalf of various medical societies and the American
Medical Association. 4 4 In this brief, the medical societies argued that in
criminalizing the abuse, neglect, and mistreatment of nursing home
residents, the New York legislature never intended a special prosecutor to
inject himself into medical decisions that are purely a matter of
physicians' professional judgment.4 5 The medical societies made clear
that their position on this issue was not to endorse physicians being able
to "get away with murder. '56 They stated that physicians who recklessly
and wantonly cause patient injury or death, illegally sell prescription
drugs, or commit other criminal acts are subject to the penal law.457 The
Einaugler case, however, was based more on a disagreement with his
clinical judgment than the violation of any criminal statutes. 458 In their
view, Dr. Einaugler was convicted of having chosen to hospitalize an
elderly nursing home patient later, rather then earlier, in the day.459
The medical societies argued it is as inappropriate to criminalize a
physician's clinical judgment as it would be to criminalize a lawyer's
4SId
4"See,e.g., Crane,supra note 253, at A17; Smith, supra note 406.

4'See BriefofAnici Curiae, People v. Einaugler, 618 N.Y.S.2d 414, 208 A.D.2d 946 (N.Y.
App.Div. 1994) (No. 93-04865) (on behalf of the Medical Society of the State of New York, The
New York State Society of Internal Medicine, the Medical Society of the County of Kings, and
the American Medical Association).
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tactical judgment.4 On occasion, wrong decisions are made. Physicians
and lawyers are human and capable of mistake.4 6 1 These mistakes of
judgment, however, have historically been redressed through civil
malpractice litigation, and professional misconduct and licensing
proceedings.462
The medical societies went on to argue that if Dr. Einaugler's
conviction is upheld, the practice of medicine in New York will be
irreparably chilled.463 No professional - much less a professional engaged
in the constant risk assessment of life and death situations - can function
efficiently with the Damoclean sword of criminal liability looming over
his head.464 The medical societies argued that affirmance of this
conviction will result in physicians either declining to treat patients at all,
or tailoring their treatment of such patients, in order to play it safe and
avoid the risk of criminal prosecution, rather than responsibly choosing
among alternatives that would better serve the patients' best interests.4 5
THE PROBLEM OF VAGUE AND GENERAL
CRIMINAL STATUTES
Why does there seem to be this increase in criminal prosecution of health
care providers for clinical mistakes and fatal errors? In a previous Article
I authored on this topic, I pointed to the circumstance where vague and
general criminal statutes are used by district attorneys to prosecute these
cases.46 6 It could be argued that these criminal statutes were never

intended to be used to prosecute physicians for mistakes in judgment; but
the foregoing cases make clear that they are being used for just that
purpose.
In Colorado, one of the criminal statutes used to prosecute Dr.
Verbrugge for criminally negligent homicide states:
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Sec. 18-3-105. Criminally negligent homicide.
Any person who causes the death of another person by conduct
amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally negligent
homicide which is a class 5 felony.
In New York, the criminal statute used to prosecute Dr. Einaugler for
reckless endangerment in the second degree states:
Sec. 120.20. Reckless endangerment in the second degree. A
person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree
when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial
risk of serious physical injury to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class A
misdemeanor.
What is evident is that very general criminal statutes are being used
to criminally prosecute health care providers in addition to any potential
civil liabilty and/or disciplinary sanctions that may be brought against a
physician. Is this fair? Is this just? Legal commentators have argued that
it is not.467 These commentators have argued these criminal statutes were
never intended to criminalize mistakes in medical judgment or care. 68
They have argued that prosecutors are wrong in using these statutes to
indict and try health care providers in the criminal arena. 46 9 However, as
long as these statutes exist, and as long as prosecutors are allowed to use
the general language of these criminal statutes to gain headlines in
prosecutions against physicians, this trend is going to continue.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented a detailed factual analysis of past and pending
cases in which criminal charges have been filed against health care
providers for clinical mistakes and fatal errors. It has also identified the
controversy surrounding such criminal prosecutions. If one kept a
scorecard of the results of the United States cases cited herein, it would
suggest that Prosecutors (5 Convictions/Plea Bargains) are losing to the
"'See, e.g., Smith, supra note 406.
631d.
" 91d.
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Health Care Providers (6 Acquittals/Reversals/Dismissed Charges/Reduced Sentences). Is there an appropriate response to this controversy?
This Author is prepared to offer his suggestions.
First, I believe the medical community needs to address a perceived
inability of the medical profession to "police its own." As long as there
are reports of cases of gross negligence by physicians which go
unpunished or which result in what is perceived to be minimal discipline,
prosecutors will continue to be able to argue that these cases are necessary
to punish conduct which the medical profession itself is unwilling, or
unable to punish. Medical licensing boards, peer review panels and other
agencies vested with the responsibility of "policing" the medical
profession need to be more vigilant in identifying and promptly taking
action in those cases deserving of disciplinary measures. If this can be
done, strong arguments can be made to let the medical profession take
care of its own. The medical profession is the most appropriate body to
evaluate and discipline care which is found to be inappropriate and these
"medical judgments" should arguably not be left to the whim of district
attorneys.
To provide a greater level of certainty to the issue of criminal
prosecution of health care providers for clinical mistakes and fatal errors,
I also advocate that the medical community involve itself in working with
state and federal legislatures in drafting laws which specifically address
this situation.
The medical societies and the AMA, in their legal brief filed in the
Einauglercase, admitted that physicians who recklessly and wantonly
cause a patient injury or death should be subject to the penal law. If that
is a position which the medical community still endorses, then legislation
could be drafted, with the advice and input of the medical profession,
which would limit criminal prosecutions of physicians for clinical
mistakes to only those cases where it can be shown that the physician
"recklessly and wantonly caused a patient injury or death." The medical
profession could even go further with such legislation to actually define
what is "reckless or wanton" care and thereby further eliminate
uncertainty as to what type of conduct would subject a physician to
criminal prosecution for clinical mistakes and fatal errors.
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This position is not without precedential authority and, interestingly,
legal authority which can be traced back to 1963. In State v. Weiner,470 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey was faced with an appeal of a physician
who was convicted on twelve counts of involuntary manslaughter because
of deaths of patients from hepatitis after having received intravenous
injections. In reversing the judgments of conviction and remanding the
case for a new trial, the New Jersey Supreme Court eloquently reminded
us of the necessary distinction between a civil tort action and a criminal
prosecution, stating:
We of course must keep in mind that this is a criminal case. In a
civil action for damages, the question is whether a loss shall
remain where it fell or be shifted to him whose act brought it
about. The test there is ordinary negligence - the failure to behave
as would a reasonable man in such circumstances. The issue being
only whether the victim or the actor shall bear the dollar impact,
the law goes far in permitting the trier of the facts to "infer" both
fault and causal connection between the fault and the loss. Indeed,
if the total circumstances bespeak a likelihood of fault upon the
part of a defendant, the law, for civil purposes, permits a jury to
infer negligence even though the precise respect in which there
was fault cannot be identified. So here, if the suit were for
damages, it could be urged (we of course have no occasion here to
pass upon it) that the total picture breathes the probability that
defendant was careless somewhere and that his unidentifiable
carelessness brought about these deaths. And in that connection,
we would not be troubled by the possibility that one of defendant's
nurses may have been the careless actor, since for the purposes of
civil liability, defendant, as the employer of a nurse, must answer
for her fault even though he was personally blameless.
But a criminal case is another matter. The injury to be
vindicated is not the personal wrong suffered by the victim but
rather an outrage to the State. And the question is not whether a
defendant should absorb the dollar loss of his victim but whether
his conduct justifies stamping him a criminal and sending him to
State Prison. In that inquiry, the test is not ordinary negligence behavior of which men of the highest character are capable.
Rather, as phrased in 1 Warren, Homicide (perm. ed. 1938), Sec.

"7 State v. Weiner, 194 A.2d 467, 41 N.J. 21 (1963).
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86, p. 424: "Negligence, to be criminal, must be reckless and
wanton and of such character as shows an utter disregard for the
safety of others under circumstances likely to cause death.""

The foregoing portion of the Weiner decision was cited with approval
by the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review in the
case of United States v. DonalM. Billig.472 The Billig Court however
went further and provided the following dissertation with regard to, not
only Dr. Billig's criminal prosecution, but criminal prosecutions of health
care providers in general for mistakes that occur in rendering care to
patients:
In Dr. Billig's case, perhaps those making prosecutorial decisions
lost sight of the fact that coronary artery bypass surgery is an
inherently risky business, performed only within approximately the
last thirty years, and that those patients who agree to this elective
surgery are quite ill in the first place, many of them gravely so.
Even when all goes well, there is a substantial risk of dying from
nothing more than the traumatic ordeal the body is subjected to in
this attempt to improve or sustain their life. People die from
complicated surgeries, and the fact that there are complications and
resultant death does not necessarily mean that any negligent act on
the part of medical personnel occurred - or if some negligent act
did occur, that anyone is criminally responsible therefor. Given
the nature of the work and its complexity, these surgeons face a
difficult enough task without having to worry about the spectre of
the criminal prosecutor - waiting to reduce to a charge sheet
honest mistakes which fall far short of the gross, wanton, and
deliberate misconduct, with an accompanying mens rea, that truly
deserves punishment.4'
In this era of ever changing treatment alternatives for a given disease
or condition, physicians do not need the specter of criminal prosecution
clouding their medical judgments and decision making. Admittedly,
negligent medical care which causes serious injury or death can ruin the
lives of "vtims" of that care. The foregoing also makes clear, however,

4'id. at 469-70.
2
4' United States v. Donal M. Billig, 26 M.L 744 (1988).
73Id. at 760-61.
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that cases of improvidently filed criminal charges brought against health
care providers for negligent acts also risk ruin to the lives and professional
reputations of health care providers who are the subject of such criminal
charges. By taking steps to enact legislation which provides some
certainty on this issue, physicians will be better able to focus on their
patients needs without the concern that one injurious or fatal mistake may
and him or her in jail.

